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‘Satan is Black’- Frantz Fanon’s Juridico-Theology of Damnation and Global 
Order 
 
Awake, arise or be for ever fall’n 
Satan in John Milton’s Paradise Lost1 
 
Frantz Fanon’s work is currently undergoing a resurgence of interest, both within the 
academy and in wider political circles. Fanon continues to be cited as an antecedent 
for contemporary anti-racist/anti-imperial theorists and activist groups, inspiring 
movements from Black Lives Matter in the U.S.A to the Economic Freedom Fighters 
in South Africa and many in-between.2 However, as the recent publication of Fanon’s 
writings show, as a scholar, he was not only concerned with realm of political 
contestation but also drew on art, literature and philosophy to inform his grand 
theories regarding the colonial ordering of the modern world.3 Fanon offers great 
value across disciplinary boundaries, however the question therefore arises as to the 
reason behind the relatively lack of substantive engagement with Fanon as a resource 
for critical legal scholarship, at least in comparison to other major theorists of the 
twentieth century such as Foucault or Derrida? For instance, there has been some 
growing interest in post/decolonial readings of law, particularly international law, 
which is seen to facilitate the persistence of relations formed by European colonialism 
even after the formal end of the colonial system.4 However, engagement with Fanon 
across this literature remains underdeveloped, even as general interest in his work 
continues to rise. The failure to draw on Fanon within studies of the law may be the 
result of a latent assumption of Fanon as revolutionary but not an intellectual, with his 
writings being considered more programmatic than theoretical; The Wretched of the 
Earth continues to be taken to be ‘the handbook for the Third World Revolution’ as it 
	   2	  
was called upon its release.5 In their crudest manifestations, readings of Fanon can 
turn him into a figure who, on account of being heavily invested in the material 
struggle of armed conflict, offers with his writings more of an instructional guide to 
national liberation than insights for critical scholarship, particularly for essentially 
reformist disciplines such as law. This reading leads to what Gayatri Spivak has 
described as the making of ‘Fanon into a clay model for revolution.’6 This article will 
commence by showing how such a reading overlooks nuances in Fanon’s framework 
and instead I will offer a reading of Fanon highlighting his critique of the juridico-
theology underpinning Euro-modernity. 
 One element that a strictly materialist, programmatic reading of Fanon tends 
to erase is his consistent referral to concepts and imagery drawn from Christian 
theology in his descriptions of the colonial structuring of the world order. Fanon’s 
writings offer guidance for understanding how the metaphysical structure of a 
coherent, Christian universal order is translated into the material reality of our modern 
global order in ways that the conventional assumptions of materialist readings would 
obscure. Therefore, I posit that a significant gap within the current literature on both 
post/decolonial and juridico-theological readings of law is the lack of engagement 
with the significance of Fanon’s posthumous magnum opus Les Damnés de la Terre 
or The Wretched of the Earth, as well as his wider body of work. The value of Fanon 
for these sub-disciplines and moreover, for anyone interested in the intersections of 
law, violence, theology and coloniality, lies in his understanding of the Euro-modern 
conception of idealised humanity as produced through the ‘damnation’ of colonized 
peoples. This article will address the absence of analysis on the theological language 
and metaphors that he uses throughout his writing through a close-reading of Fanon 
that brings into clear focus the theological undercurrents that anchor the Euro-modern 
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concept of ‘humanity’ that persists into the contemporary moment, perhaps nowhere 
with greater import than within the discourse and norms of international law.  
A supplementary element of this article will be to emphasise the full scale of 
the heretical challenge forwarded in Les Damnés de la Terre by placing it in 
conversation with John Milton’s epic poem Paradise Lost. Conforming with Jane 
Gordon’s case for engaging with ‘creolizing’ readings of canonical figures and paying 
attention to the echoes of Paradise Lost within Fanon’s call for decolonial revolution, 
I will clarify the theoretical insight offered by Fanon’s writings.7 Through Fanon, we 
can see the relevance of Milton’s narrative of Satanic rebellion against the deific order 
for the colonial context. The reading together of these authors, who ordinarily would 
be categorised as wholly removed from one another, allows firstly, the theological 
framework and language that Fanon used to inform his theory of colonialism to 
become clearer and secondly to problematize orthodoxies of the context of emerging 
European colonialism and the rise of international law in which Milton was writing 
Paradise Lost.  
 
A I. The Theological Fanon  
 
Fanon’s work did not dismiss or deemphasise the way the material relations of 
production underwrote colonial ordering, but neither did he simply reduce racial 
subjectivisation to a manifestation of structural economic relations. Reading Fanon 
closely reveals how the reciprocal recognition of dialectical class antagonism under 
capitalism was underwritten by a formative (mis)recognition of the colonized subject 
through colonization.8 Moreover, this anchoring of Euro-modernity in the subjugation 
of the colonized subject can be seen to also facilitate the transition of the Euro-
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modern perspective into a self-acclaimed position of not only universality but also 
omnipotence. Once an image of Euro-modernity as functioning as a deific surrogate is 
understood by the reader, then the metaphysical quality of Fanon’s writings begins to 
appear as more than a stylistic idiosyncrasy. His consistent use of theological 
descriptors to capture the condition of colonized existence speaks to an appreciation 
of colonization being not simply a material process of primitive accumulation, but 
also as a juridical and theological process of turning particular universal subjects into 
deific surrogates (Sovereign, White, European Man) and others into damned peoples 
(the colonized, racialised other) 
The reading of Fanon offered above immediately disturbs particular 
orthodoxies held about the Martiniquan psychiatrist. Critics such as Hannah Arendt 
admonished Fanon for championing ‘glorified violence for violence sake […] 
motivated by a much deeper hatred for bourgeois society.’9 For Arendt, Fanon’s 
discussions of race is a politics based on purely ‘biological terms’, thereby rendering 
his call for revolution ‘non-political’ and incapable of improving the conditions of 
collective life through such particularism.10 Arendt’s reading of Fanon has been 
extensively critiqued in the body of literature however, which has illustrated the gaps 
within her attempt to delegitimise the potential of political violence as a tool for 
liberation.11 However, Arendt’s misreading of Fanon still shares terrain with some of 
those who celebrate Fanon but only through reading his theory as operating solely on 
a material register. For example, in a spirited attempt to recover Fanon from the 
characterisations of him as mere prophet of violence, Immanuel Wallerstein attempts 
to reconcile Fanon with a European tradition of rationalism, declaring ‘Frantz Fanon 
was a man of reason and of rational action, very much a product and an exemplar of 
the spirit of the Enlightenment in the tradition of Marx.’12 This picture of Fanon, 
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though critically insightful, keeps his writings contained within the realms of the 
material. 
An overly-materialist image of Fanon is troubled by an inability to account for 
his consistent articulation of the decolonized experience through the grammar of the 
theological. Fanon teaches us that the ‘colonial world is a Manichean world,’ with the 
European symbolising the omnipotent good and the colonized becoming the absolute 
evil.13 He speaks to how the subjugation of the colonized functions as if by deific 
decree; the colonized ‘accepts the disintegration ordained by God, bows down before 
the settler.’14 For Fanon, the condition of the Negro under colonization is not simply a 
question of biology but infused within these ‘scientific’ claims is a latent theology: 
the negro is not only determined as being ‘strong, athletic, potent’ but also raises the 
spectre of the ‘devil, sin’ through association.15 If the Negro strives to be acceptable 
to Euro-modernity they will be unable to descend even ‘into a real hell’ but if they 
recognise and confront their condition, they will find themselves trapped in the ‘zone 
of non-being,’ a descriptor that recalls Saint Augustine’s famous description of evil.16 
Translating a theological order of being into the material order of colonization, Fanon 
shows us how the discursive field of modernity renders the colonized as the ‘symbol 
of Evil’ while Euro-modernity claims the characteristics of even the ‘merciful God’ 
for itself.17  
Any cursory review of Fanon’s work will betray many more examples of this 
consistent referral to the theological in order to describe the conditions of 
colonization, as will be illustrated over the remainder of this article. It is an aspect of 
Fanon’s writing that presents an intriguing question for scholars; the theological 
Fanon demands an explanation that escapes strict materialism. In comparison to say, 
Walter Benjamin, a European theorist with whom Fanon’s apocalyptic visions of 
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political violence might be placed in conversation with, readings of the work that a 
Christianized grammar of thought may be doing within Fanonian scholarship has been 
under-explored.18 In the service of illustrating Fanon’s value to both post/decolonial 
and juridico-theological critiques of law, the examples above provide an ideal entry 
point.19 For Fanon’s persistence in drawing on theological does not simply betray a 
Christianized style of discourse but the linguistic choices he makes are inscribed 
within a broader framework for thinking through colonial and post-colonial relations.  
 
A II. Damnation and Colonization 
 
The few engagements with the religious aspect of Fanon’s thought have also 
tended to emphasise Fanon’s materialism, assuming him to be a dogmatic critic of 
religion, an atheist who, in-step with a vulgar tradition of Marxism, dismissed 
Christianity as pure ideology, mobilized only to entrench colonial power.20 
Scholarship on Fanon has assumed him to be wholly dismissive of the theological 
realm by reading within his writings a vehement rejection of not only European 
Christianity but also of native religions as well.21  
However, another understanding of operative function of the theology within 
Fanon’s writing is offered by Lewis Gordon’s work.22 Gordon emphasizes, for those 
quick to categorize Fanon as a theorist imagining the world only through the scientific 
or material, the importance of remembering that ‘Fanon’s formal education was 
exclusively western and […] predominately Roman Catholic, [which] means that the 
grammar of normative life would take the form of the churches founding imagery in 
spite of Fanon’s existential atheism.’23 Biographical work on Fanon tells us that by 
being raised in a petit-bourgeois, colonial family where ‘church going was something 
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to be taken serious’, Fanon’s familiarity with ecclesiastical concepts and ideas would 
have been entrenched from an early age.24 An understanding of the extent to which 
the theological will have coloured Fanon’s formative experience of colonization 
begins to provide a lens through which to view the consistency of his aforementioned 
reference to Christian concepts and descriptors to capture the nature of colonialism.  
Rather than a presuming that as a scientist and Marxist, Fanon exemplifies a 
strict, atheistic rejection all things religious for the materialist or scientific realm, if 
we proceed from an understanding how theological concepts continue to inform 
ostensibly secularized modern concepts such as politics or law, i.e what is known as 
political/juridico-theological readings,  a deeper insight is offered by Fanon’s 
writings. This is not to speculate on Fanon’s own personal attitude to religion, but to 
illustrate how Fanon’s references to religion are best read not as a contradiction in his 
thought but rather as the expression of his understanding of Euro-modernity being 
informed by an adoption of a theological schema. In short, could Fanon be better read 
as casting the dispossession and violence suffered by the colonized in the making of 
modern world order as a tale of a Paradise Lost? Furthermore, can we see Fanon’s 
description of the condition of the colonized as equivalent to hell before calling on 
those colonized to storm the heavens in violent revolution as echoing the call issued 
by the heroic depiction of Satan in John Milton’s epic poem of deific rebellion? 
It is important to remember when reading Fanon’s references to colonized life 
as ‘hell’, ‘damnation’ or ‘evil’ that the Christian gospels are, in fact, largely devoid of 
depictions of these ideas. When asking, what does it mean to imagine ‘hell’ or ‘evil’, 
we should start from an appreciation of how most of our popular understandings of 
these now ubiquitous concepts actually derive not from the Bible but actually from 
medieval and early modern literature and art.25 Recognising the role that artistic 
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representation has played in producing our imaginings of heaven and hell helps to 
understand Gordon’s methodological decision to read Fanon’s Black Skin, White 
Masks alongside the primary representation of hell in the European literary canon – 
Dante Alighieri's Inferno, the most famous section of La Commedia. Rather than 
seeing Fanon’s first book in the orthodox manner of an attempt at psychoanalytical 
self-interrogation, Gordon illuminates the way in which Black Skin, White Masks 
traces the structure of Dante’s unnamed protagonist’s descent through hell. In his first 
book Fanon captures the nature of racism as the paradoxical attempt to try to force a 
set of humans out of the category of humanity, a structure that builds a Hegelian 
dialectic of recognition between two (European) human subjects on top of a 
relegation of black humanity into a condition of damnation, now to be cast as a 
contradiction in terms.26 Gordon shows us how Black Skin, White Masks guides the 
reader towards being submerged in the full omnipotent experience of racial 
subjugation, just as Virgil guides the protagonists of Dante’s epic poem to the depths 
of the centre of Hell.27 Furthermore, as Virgil eventually leads the protagonist out of 
damnation at the end Fanon’s similarly closes Black Skin, White Masks with an 
optimistic ‘final prayer: O my body, make of me always a man who questions’ as he 
emerges from the depths of racial self-hatred.28 This assertion of the ‘I’ of the colonial 
subject as a full being at the end of Black Skin, White Masks, represents the heart of 
Fanon’s theoretical project. He is declaring in the face of a world that insisting on this 
claim being a contradictory impossibility that ‘I’ am Black and ‘I’ am human, and 
perhaps most crucially, that this declaration of Black humanity is not dependent upon 
white recognition. The conclusion of Black Skin, White Masks provides a perspective 
that Fanon will transfer from the solipsistic towards the international in his later 
writings; this basic assertion of Black humanity becomes the vantage point from 
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which he then analysed the global systems and norms that seek to render such an 
assertion illegitimate.  
 The Wretched of the Earth remains the outstanding exemplar of Fanon’s 
global schema. However, currently under-developed in the literature on this book is 
the debt that it carries to a theological grammar underpinning Fanon’s understanding 
of global order, similar to Gordon’s reading of Black Skin, White Masks. An 
immediate example is the title: The Wretched of the Earth is entitled Les Damnés de 
la Terre in its original French and much of the philosophical significance of this 
concept of ‘damnation’ is lost through the English translation into ‘Wretched.’ The 
description of ‘damnation’ speaks to how the metaphysical structure of theology is 
translated into the material reality of our modern global order. Fanon’s understanding 
of the modern world order credits European colonialism with the creation of damned 
peoples who are physically marked through their deviation from a predetermined 
standard. As the standard is geo-temporally located within Euro-modernity, the 
cleaving of difference necessarily demarcated a European exceptionalism that 
justified the material exploitation of colonialism, showing how the political project of 
colonialism bleeds into the corporeal project of racialisation. If colonial division 
provided the geo-temporal structure for world order, racism concretised this structure 
through corporeal markers (skin colour, hair type, facial features, etc.) to impose a 
discursive language of branding upon human bodies.29  In short, Fanon speaks to how 
a juridico-theological mythopoetics behind the language of racism facilitates the 
construction of particular peoples as damned.30 This argument becomes clearer upon 
taking notice of the use of juridico-theological mythopoetics in Les Damnés de la 
Terre as the extract below exemplifies: 
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The colonial world is a Manichean world. It is not enough for the settler to 
delimit physically, that is to say with the help of the army and the police 
force, the place of the native. As if to show the totalitarian character of 
colonial exploitation the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessence 
of evil.31 
 
What Fanon describes in the above passage is how colonization was not merely a 
practice of land seizure, resource exploitation or political control, but was also the 
translation of the deific conceptions of absolute good and absolute evil onto different 
categorisations of humanity. Fanon further speaks to the intertwinement of theology 
and colonialism when he argues how in the colonies ‘the church does not call the 
native to God's ways but to the ways of the white man, of the master.’32 This 
description illustrates how the role of the bible in colonization is not merely to 
encourage the colonized to worship the white man’s God but moreover to accept a 
schema that understands the white man as a God, as the standard to be idealised. 
Inversely the colonized occupies the position that evil does in the theological 
structure, within the colonial schema ‘[a]ll values, in fact, are irrevocably poisoned 
and diseased as soon as they are allowed in contact with the colonized race’ hence 
why the colonized puts destruction of the native, the ‘parasites, the bearers of disease, 
on the same level as the Christian religion which wages war on embryonic heresies 
and instincts, and on evil as yet unborn.’33 Like with Black Skin, White Masks, an 
attention to the way that theological symbols and metaphors pepper Les Damnés de la 
Terre are important for a full understanding of the philosophical depths of the text.  
 
A. III. A ‘study of revenge’34 
  
The reading of Fanon that emphasises his understanding of the indebtedness of 
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the racialised structuring of the colonial world to the Christainised conceptions of 
being can be aided through placing Les Damnés de la Terre into conversation with the 
classic literary account of revolt by the damned against the deific order in the Western 
canon, 17th Century English revolutionary John Milton’s epic poem Paradise Lost.35 
Like Fanon, Milton uses his most famous poem to offer an apocalyptic narrative of 
rebellion and if, following Gordon, we can see how Dante and Black Skin White 
Masks mirror each other through their accounts of the descent into damnation, then 
reading Fanon’s final book and its call for decolonization alongside Milton’s 
depiction of the Satanic revolt against the divine allows for a finer appreciation of the 
philosophical sophistication of Fanon’s provocation. Milton’s poem was famously 
provocative in its retelling of the biblical story of the fall but in a manner that made 
God or Adam the protagonist but rather Satan. Paradise Lost allows the reader to 
sympathise with injustice that has been endured by a heroic Satan and to understand 
his commitment into bringing ‘foul disorder’ into the celestial hierarchy of being that 
has sought to assign him to damnation.36 In his resentful anger and righteous 
indignation, Milton’s Satan can be seen as offering a prototype through which to read 
Fanon’s ‘native’ in Les Damnés de la Terre. In his earlier writings, Fanon had already 
described how, within the colonial schema, ‘Satan is black.’37 Sustaining this 
metaphor, we can see how Fanon’s ‘native’ echoes Milton’s Satan in challenging a 
celestial hierarchy of another kind, advocating for decolonization through ‘a program 
of complete disorder.’38 
 Supporting my argument of reading Paradise Lost together with Les Damnés 
de la Terre in a manner similar to Gordon’s reading of Black Skin, White Masks 
alongside Inferno is the body of literary scholarship that has already sought to 
establish Milton’s poem as the canonical respondent to Dante’s epic work.39 For 
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instance, George F. Butler illustrates how Milton draws not only theological 
inspiration from Dante, but also read La Commedia as a political work, one that 
provided a schema through which we could understand and thereby question 
ecclesiastical and political power.40 The political element within the struggle of deific 
order is amplified in Milton’s tale of the fall from Paradise, with an immediate 
distinction between Milton and Dante’s epic poems being the presentation of the 
figure of Satan. Dante’s Satan remains trapped within his condition of damnation, a 
muted, monstrous representation of the fate that awaits humanity should it not halt its 
descent; Milton instead turns the fallen angel into a Promethean hero, he becomes the 
protagonist of the story with his poetic, seductive expressions of envy and pride 
convincing his fellow outcasts from Paradise to engage in rebellion against divine 
authority. In his recasting of the Satanic figure in heroic terms, Milton provides 
suggestion to his own history as not only a poet but also an active participant in 
revolution, a contributor to the English revolution that resulted the visceral defeat of 
sovereign authority, the execution of the monarch proclaiming to be God’s chosen 
representative of earth.41  
Though of course not determinate, the biographic should be taken into 
consideration when placing Milton’s most famous work, Paradise Lost, as sitting at 
the forefront of the early modern period’s translation of questions of religious 
contestation into questions of law and juridical order.42 The poem was produced in a 
context in which it is recognised that legal and theological ideas animate one another. 
Moreover, it is worthwhile recalling that Milton witnessed revolution occurring not 
only in the domestic order but also in the global order of law; his epic poem was 
written in the midst of the great expansion of European empire. The age in which 
Milton was thinking and writing was one in which the primitive accumulation of 
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Euro-modern empire building combined the contest for heaven with the conquest of 
the earth in a manner that orthodox international legal scholarship has often separated 
rather than treating as thoroughly interwoven. 
A more critical strain of scholarship has begun to argue for reading the early 
modern period, particularly the formative era of European colonization, as being 
productive of the modern law of nations.43 In addition, it has also begun to establish 
the important role that Christian eschatology and, by extension, wider theology plays 
in informing the presuppositions of modern law.44 Combining these two trends, 
scholars have turned to seeing Francisco De Vitoria, the sixteenth-century Spanish 
theologian and jurist emerging from the famed School of Salamanca, as the founding 
father of international law.45 Christopher Warren places Milton’s Paradise Lost in 
conversation with the history of international law, showing him to have been a keen 
reader of the founding theorists of the law of nations, including Vitoria. As Warren 
states ‘Milton was almost certainly familiar with Vitoria’ and in his epic poem 
‘Milton was laying bare the opportunistic Vergilianism that had featured heavily 
among Iberian writers on the law of nations beginning with the Spanish Dominican 
Francisco de Vitoria.’46 Warren further suggests that ‘Milton uses the episode to 
satirize a voraciously instrumental imperialism that has conscripted epic, linguistic, 
and legal conventions for seemingly fathomless imperial projects.’47 The age in which 
Milton was thinking and writing was one which figures such as Vitoria were 
synthesising the juridical and the theological is service of the transition of 
international community to be anchored on Europe rather than the Christendom. 
Milton’s epic poem, written contemporaneously with the rapid expansion of European 
imperialism, reads as a metonym for the world-ordering events of his age, European 
empire building echoing the mythology of contest for heaven in the material the 
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conquest of the earth. Warren suggests that it ‘was precisely Milton’s project to signal 
changed legal relations’ of his time in the poem, following the innovations in 
jurisprudence produced by Vitoria and company in response to the Spanish conquest 
of the Americas.48 A reading of Paradise Lost as a ‘dramatic repurposing of a writer 
like Vitoria’ to conceptualise the ‘fall’ as analogous to the severance of claims to just 
title performed through imperialism, ensures that understandings of Milton do not 
forget the connections that his writings offer to the co-current period of the formation 
of international law mapping of a colonial world order.49  
The connection between Vitoria, early international law and Paradise Lost 
helps us see the theological undercurrent to imperialism through this allegory for 
empire.50 Moreover, Milton’s narrative arch of an Angelic War prior the ‘Fall of Man’ 
distinguishes his retelling from other accounts of the Genesis story. Milton’s tale of 
original sin is shadowed by the story of the ‘war in heaven’, retold at length by the 
Angel Raphael in Book V of Paradise Lost. Milton’s epic poem illustrates the 
formative role that the damnation of the heaven’s fallen angels plays in the making of 
the material world. In the casting out of the fallen angels, we find a parallel for the 
dispossession and expulsion suffered by the colonized. As aforementioned in the early 
discussion of Black Skin, White Masks and Inferno, on a philosophical level the 
production of the colonized as a subject functioned as a ‘secularized’ equivalent of the 
descent into hell. If colonization was legitimised by the jurisprudence of its time, then 
we must ask what are the elements of the juridico-theological thought of that moment 
that could facilitated the descent?  
 
A. IV. The Damnation of the Colonized and the Primitive Accumulation 
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With Milton writing in context of European colonialism and allowing his work 
to be informed by the writings of early European international jurists, it invites 
clarification as to the role law played in the production of the colonial world order. 
International legal scholarship has, across a variety of theoretical approaches, 
recognised the role that colonialism played in the formation of the discipline. 
Providing the canonical Marxist engagement with international law, Evgeny 
Pashukanis contends that international law seeks to mask the competing class 
positions inherent across an imperial, global capitalist market through a juridical 
claim of foundational sovereign equality.51 Speaking directly to the role of colonial 
violence in the production of this order, Marxist international legal scholarship has 
emphasised the way in which the juridical framework was implemented to legitimise 
the conquest of the Americas that produced the world capitalist market.52 The early 
modern law of nations is taken to embody not only the material violence of 
colonialism, but also to facilitate the abstraction of commodity exchange.53 
Furthermore, other materialist readings of international law have argued that the role 
of the discipline in facilitating colonial dispossession reveals its function as a 
mechanism of primitive accumulation.54 Drawing on Marx’s famed concept 
describing the founding violence that was used to decouple populations from ways of 
reproducing their lives other than through compliance with capitals demands, an 
understanding of international law as primitive accumulation turns the discipline from 
a universal jurisprudence governing the world market into primarily a means of 
rendering invisible the colonial extraction through which capital is initially 
accumulated. Mark Neocleous summarises this idea of international law as primitive 
accumulation, arguing that the discipline was: 
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Concerned not just questions of sovereignty or legal title by conquest, as 
per mainstream international law, or imperialism and racial supremacy 
over ‘the other’, as per critical international law […] but was in fact 
centrally concerned with the violent enclosure of land and resources for 
capital accumulation […] that is, with the process of primitive 
accumulation.55  
 
This understanding of international law as primitive accumulation does the crucial 
work of exposing an interconnected legal framework governing relations of trade, 
conflict, land acquisition and maritime expeditions as having enabled and sustained 
the emergence of capitalism, through colonialism. Even in the contemporary moment, 
an imperial legacy continues to inform the judicial regulations that maintain the 
relations of property and contract across borders, facilitating the access capital claims 
to its primary resources. However, an over-emphasis on an image of colonial violence 
as creating the material conditions for capitalist relations of production does risk 
masking the importance of the construction of the colonized peoples in a distinct 
mode of juridical personality and theological debt that underpinned this shift. This is 
what we can understand as the juridico-theology of international law. 
Vitoria helps to illuminate this juridico-theological element. More specifically, 
it is in two sets of Vitoria’s lectures, De Indis Noviter Inventis and De Jure Bellis 
Hispanorum in Barbaros, that international legal scholars and historians root the 
origins of the discipline.56 The topic of these lectures are a juridical conceptualisation 
of the relations between the Spanish and the Amerindians, in other words, the 
ordering of the formative relations of the European colonial project. To posit Vitoria 
as an origin for what we currently call international law is to accept that international 
law ‘did not precede and thereby effortlessly resolve the problem of Spanish-Indian 
relations; rather, international law was created out of the unique issues generated by 
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the encounter between the Spanish and the Indians.’57 Scholarship on Vitoria initially 
celebrated him for recognising the humanity of the colonial subject and thereby 
inviting the colonized within the law of nations, to be bound by the same laws and 
principles that governed the European.58 However, more recent critiques have 
emphasised Vitoria’s ultimate accommodation of colonial violence once the colonized 
peoples are within the remit of the law.59 Once brought within the law, the colonized 
are held to be substandard by its norms, thereby licensing a particularly insidious 
form of violence, ‘precisely because it is presented in the language of liberty and even 
equality.’60 It is their invitation within the totalising order of law that renders them 
damned, impelled to realise standards of ‘ideal’ humanity that were produced in 
contradistinction to them. For instance, Vitoria’s invitation of the colonized into a 
universal jurisprudence professes to a recognition of equivalent juridical personality 
between the colonized and the European based on notions of trade and hospitality; in 
fact Vitoria overlooks or ignores how the ‘trade’ between the colonized and the 
European took the form of violent plunder by one side rather than exchange.61 The 
material realities of the context to which he was writing meant that Vitoria’s jus 
gentium, which initially appears to legislate universal rights, in practice ultimately 
authorises Spanish incursion into and exploitation of the Americas. Once conscripted 
within the remit of international law, any transgression of its norms by the colonized, 
such as resistance against the colonizer’s incursions, was rendered an act of 
aggression, thereby legitimizing war.  
Moreover, Vitoria’s legal ordering of colonial violence should be remembered 
as being a product of political/juridico-theology as much as geopolitics. Vitoria 
remained a committed theologian throughout his career and was explicit in his quest 
to bring to bear his Thomism onto the political questions of the day.62 His ability to 
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straddle the sacred and the secular captures the impetus of the early modern period to 
ground formerly theological questions in the terms of the juridical. Vitoria’s inclusion 
of the colonized within his universal jurisprudence but in a condition of primary 
exclusion, traps them within the confines of a legal order that rejects them, whilst also 
not allowing them to escape that order. The inclusion that is professed by the Vitorian 
schema is always an inclusion deferred, as the colonized is invited inside the universal 
whilst also being charged to be the constitutive outside against which it is contrasted. 
The colonized is therefore trapped in an impossible position: full inclusion into the 
universal order is dependent upon being able to conform, to progress to a standard 
that pre-determined by European and therefore held to their unique notions of what 
would constitute an ideal universal humanity.63 Vitoria’s translation of a theological 
schema onto these questions of universal law and order allows the European to 
function as the ‘perfect’, standard for universal humanity, complete and ontologically 
whole within itself.64 In contradistinction to the ‘perfect’ standard, Vitoria placed the 
colonized as ‘perfectable’, currently imperfect but to be elevated towards the 
European standard eventually.65 However, the impossibility of that elevation is 
illustrated by the persistence of the distinction between the ‘perfect’ European and the 
‘perfectable’ colonized into the modern notions of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ 
peoples within contemporary, humanitarian international law. Instead, what early 
modern jurisprudence achieves, rather than generously invite the colonized into the 
realm of universal humanity, is in fact to facilitate the confinement of the colonized 
within what Fanon elegantly describes as damnation on the earth.66 The colonized 
and their practices are rejected by a universal into which they are compelled to enter, 
a paradox that demands that they must become ‘perfect’ human but can only do by 
realising a standard that was constituted in opposition to their very being. Damnation 
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describes the theologically indebted jurisprudence that constructs what Fanon states 
as ‘the immobility to which the native is condemned,’ the structure of the universal 
law leaves the colonised in the equivalent of being damned. 67  
 
A. V. Fanon and the Theodicy of Law 
 
Taking account of the juridico-theological aspect of European colonialism aids 
the appreciation of Fanon’s philosophical value. Fanon’s work remains an essential 
resource for scholars who theorise race as a primary organising principle of the global 
political order, however whilst there has been some engagement with him by those 
concerned with questions of law, this area of Fanonian scholarship could still be seen 
as underdeveloped, especially considering the body of literature that emphasises the 
relationship between colonialism and the international legal order.68 For Fanon, 
question of the juridical play an key role in colonial world order, with colonialism as 
a system being propelled by a belief in ‘the necessity to establish law and order 
among the barbarians.’69 As recent international legal scholarship has established the 
colonial encounter as a violent originary moment of the Euro-modernity, an 
engagement with Fanon, particularly his avocation of colonialism as ‘violence in its 
purest state,’ only enriches these readings of the imperial roots of the modern world 
order, bringing the post/decolonial critiques of international law together with the rich 
tradition of legal scholarship concerning the intimate relationship between law and 
violence.70 Echoing the perspective of Walter Benjamin, who emphasised particularly 
the ‘law-making’ potential of legal violence, Fanon’s reading of colonial violence 
illuminates its operation as a ‘constitutive-yet paradoxical- legal force’ and, I would 
argue, gestures towards Vitoria’s invitation of the colonized into a juridical schema 
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constituted by their exclusion.’71 Fanon reads the violence of the colonizer and the 
law imposed by the colonial legal order as one and the same. Crucially, this legal 
system does not merely separate the colonized from means of subsistence outside of 
capital relations as is captured by the Marxist descriptor of primitive accumulation but 
is further constitutive of the colonial legal personality itself. Gary Boire captures how 
‘colonial law is, for Fanon, a multivalent phenomenon: a material force, a form of 
representation, a multidimensional constitutive discourse, a system that forms colonial 
subjects and subjectivities.’72 Far from simply being a codified set of rules, law 
categorizes and constitutes notions of ideal humanity and in the process of 
colonization this categorization would be made explicit through the signifier of race. 
Fanon’s conceptualization of colonization as damnation, when properly 
unpacked, helps us to read international law as facilitating the encasing of particular 
bodies within this paradoxical space of inclusion/exclusion; the subject position of the 
contradictions of modernity is damned to reside in what he describes as ‘the zone of 
non-being’.73 The description Fanon chooses immediately raises the question of 
‘theodicy’ as held within the tradition of scholasticism.  
Theodicy refers to the problematic of accounting for the presence of evil in 
God’s world. Was it outside the power of God to simply erase the evil contained in 
the world? If so, how could scholastics maintain a belief in God’s omnipotence? Was 
evil external to God’s will? If it was, then it disrupted God’s omnipotence and if it 
was not, then it disrupted God’s claim to be good.74 Augustine sought to resolve this 
problem through casting evil as ‘not a nature but a kind of non-being’.75 For 
Augustine, evil should not be imagined as an entity in itself: ‘For what is that which 
we call evil but the absence of good?’76 Evil does not possess a nature itself; it 
consists only as the failed realisation of what should be: the good. Returning to the 
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‘zone of non-being’, which for Fanon, encapsulates the lived experience of the 
racialised/colonized other, we see how the conscription of the colonized into a 
universal order – as a failed realisation of the idealised European – mirrors this 
conception of theodicy. For Fanon, it was not a coincidence but a necessary function 
that within ‘the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation the settler paints the 
native as a sort of quintessence of evil’.77 The zone of non-being functions as the 
limits of the colonized paradoxical existence. The colonized are trapped in ‘the hellish 
cycle,’ indefinitely rendered as a failed model in the hierarchy of humanity now 
arrogated to the realm of the universal.78 The racial/colonial other exists only in 
negation and it is through this state of negation against the idealised humanity of 
Euro-modernity that it takes on the condition of ‘absolute evil’ within an ostensibly 
secularized world. Fanon clarifies this by illustrating how within this order the 
racial/colonial other ‘is the corrosive element, destroying all that comes near him; he 
is the deforming element, disfiguring all that has to do with beauty or morality; he is 
the depository of maleficent powers.’79 Lewis Gordon further explains this parallel 
between Fanon’s understanding of ‘the damned’ and Augustine’s classic response to 
the problem of theodicy by stating:   
 
Western thought […] led to a theodicy of Western civilisation […] 
systems that were complete and intrinsically legitimate in all aspects of 
human life […] while its incompleteness, its failure to be so, hallmarks 
the ‘dark side of thought’ lived by those constantly crushed under its 
heels, remained a constant source of anxiety […] People of colour, 
particularly black people live the contradictions of this self-deception.80 
 
Following the structure of theodicy, the racial subaltern subject cannot be truly other 
to the universal humanity of modernity, lest that humanity not be truly universal and 
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the system not be truly complete. Yet those for whom the characteristics of humanity 
have been historically denied exist as ‘the not-yet’ within this schematic, those 
damned are trapped in a process that is indefinitely deferred. Fanon captures this 
paradox with his description of the racial subaltern subject as ‘rooted at the core of a 
universe from which he must be extricated.’81 This structure of ‘humanity’ matches 
the structure offered by Vitoria to anchor the early modern Law of Nations and that 
continues to inform contemporary, humanitarian international law. 
To see a connection between the ‘secularized’ global order of Euro-modernity 
and the Christianised global order that preceded it points to an explanation for why 
the colonized/racially subaltern subject takes on ‘the principle of evil’.82 Fanon guides 
us in appreciating how the ontological structure Augustine called upon to account for 
evil is transformed under modernity into the explanation for the racial subaltern 
subject. For within modernity’s universal humanity, the racial other ‘is not a man’.83 
Instead, he ‘is declared insensible to ethics; he represents not only the absence of 
values, but also the negation of values. He is, let us dare to admit, the enemy of 
values, and in this sense he is the absolute evil’.84 This preceding quote from Les 
Damnés de la Terre offers the only reference to Black Skins, White Masks in Fanon’s 
1961 posthumous classic, illustrating the importance of the configuration of the 
colonized/racial subaltern as ‘evil’ within the schema of world ordering that Fanon 
seeks to unpack. 85 This theological connection of the enclosing of the subjectivity of 
the colonized in a condition of damnation– detailed in Black Skins, White Masks – 
with the world order that sustains itself through the licensing of violence upon that 
damned subject – as detailed in Les Damnés de la Terre – provides the key link 
between Fanon’s two outstanding scholarly contributions, and, I would argue, his 
intellectual project as a whole. 
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It is the ontological structure of colonialism described above, the encasing of 
particular categories of humans in an order of being that renders them non-beings, 
that helps clarify the philosophical significance of the comparisons that Fanon 
consistently draws between Christian conceptions of evil and the construction of the 
colonized within the order of Euro-modernity. For Fanon, it is not coincidental that 
‘the Devil, the Evil Spirit, the Bad Man, the Savage are always symbolized by 
Negroes.’86 The founding violence of colonialism is not merely the primitive 
accumulation that facilitates capitalist relations of production, but moreover, it is the 
construction of a political and juridical identity of damned peoples, peoples whose 
fall, as with the rebel angels of Paradise Lost, functions as the pre-requisite of making 
a new world. Once we appreciate this we can understand why Fanon declares that, 
within the theodician schema of European colonialism, ‘Satan is black.’87  
 Appreciating the juridico-theological element of colonization gives us a new 
perspective on Fanon’s materialism, as well as adding a further element to the 
emphasis he places on understanding the world through a lens of racialised violence. 
While still a Marxist, Fanon recognised that the colonial relationship was absent of a 
dialectical structure. Fanon perceived the mutual recognition of the Hegelian master 
and slave dialectic as reaching its limit in the colonial world and instead illustrated 
how the colonial relation is not a relation of subjugation but rather a non-relation. The 
mistake that Marxist scholarship was making was the presumption that race was 
produced solely through capital’s voracious greed and used primarily as a means to 
divide workers. In a scathing engagement with future collaborator Jean-Paul Sartre's 
critique of the Negritude movement, Fanon took care to stress the error committed by 
Sartre, for whom colonial exploitation was a substrate of the universal struggle 
between labour and capital. In Black Orpheus Sartre dismisses the identitarian basis 
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of political engagement, concluding his review of the radical potential offered by an 
embrace of Black identity by arguing that ‘negritude appears as the up-beat of a 
dialectical progression: the theoretical and practical affirmation of white supremacy is 
the thesis.’88 For Sartre, negritude, as the preeminent articulation of racialised identity 
politics at that time, could only be a minor term in the movement towards revolution; 
it was a particularised form of anti-racist racism that could function so as to radicalise 
the black population, allowing them en-masse to obtain the necessary class 
consciousness to become active participants in a universal revolutionary struggle.89 
Fanon admonished Sartre’s critique of negritude for erasing the native’s claim to full 
human subjectivity through enfolding that claim back into a state of dependency. 
Referring to Sartre’s writings in Black Orpheus, Fanon states: 
 
And, when I tried, on the level of ideas and intellectual activity, to reclaim 
my negritude, it was snatched away from me. Proof was presented that my 
effort was only a term in the dialectic.90 
 
Fanon’s response was a rejection of the orthodox Marxist conception of revolution as 
a historically determined conclusion to the internal contradictions of capital-labour 
relations. Showing how the Euro-modern conception of humanity was not, in fact, 
universal but rather exclusive, Fanon highlights a need for a transformation of our 
ideas of what constitutes the ‘human’ to be placed at the heart of the decolonial 
struggle. When this aspect for Fanon is fully acknowledged, then a decolonizing 
revolution, becomes one of not only a question of a change in official legal status or 
just a formal recognition of the status of sovereignty; instead, a decolonial revolution 
is challenged with the blasphemous task of transforming conceptions of the human. 
With the global order being produced through the casting out of the colonized, 
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Fanon’s decolonization requires us ‘to humanise this world which has been forced 
down to animal level by imperial powers.’91 This call should not be confused for the 
Satre’s dismissal of the question of race as merely a minor term as within a grand, 
materialist conception of history. Rather than wait for the colonized to reach the 
European standard in order to join in with the revolutionary struggle against 
capitalism, Fanon instead implores the European to ‘fall’ into an alliance with the 
colonized. Fanon concludes Les Damnés with a generous appeal to Europeans to 
overcome their investment in Euro-modernity and ‘fall’ in with those who have been 
damned in the process of their deification. Describing his vision of decolonisation, he 
states:  
 
This huge task which consists of reintroducing mankind into the world, 
the whole of mankind, will be carried out with the indispensable help, of 
the European peoples, who themselves must realize that in the past they 
have often joined the ranks of our common masters where colonial 
questions were concerned. To achieve this, the European peoples must 
first decide to wake up and shake themselves, use their brains, and stop 
playing the stupid game of the Sleeping Beauty.92  
 
Les Damnés de la Terre recognised the material violence that Sartre emphasised in 
Black Orpheus and that is captured by the idea of early international law as primitive 
accumulation. Fanon describes colonialism as concerned with extracting the most 
‘essential value from the native’ providing capital with a regular supply of cheap 
labour.93 He recognises the colonialism is also concerned with separating the 
colonized from their means of subsistence, appropriating resources of which ‘the most 
concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land which will bring them bread and, 
above all, dignity.’94 However, Fanon also pushed beyond these standard Marxist 
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critiques to illustrate the further juridico-theological project to lock the colonized in a 
condition of damnation, caught both within and against the totalising (Europeanised) 
humanity. To be damned is to be rendered permanently deficient within an order of 
being that you cannot escape, to be confined permanently to this condition of 
privation. Such an admonishment is experienced as a metaphysical crisis, as if the 
victim was ‘weighed down by the curse of God.’95 To undo the ‘disintegration 
ordained by God’ Fanon requires for the colonized to rebel against this deific order 
and for their European allies to embrace the ‘fall’ themselves.96 Sartre’s correction of 
his earlier missteps in Black Orpheus in his preface to Les Damnés de la Terre 
provides an example of how this may be achieved.97  
 
A. VI. Conclusion  
 
The importance of Fanon’s understanding of Euro-modern conception of 
humanity as produced through the damnation of colonized subjects offers relevance to 
those who read a political/juridico-theology within European colonialism and the co-
current development of international law. Marx famously describes primitive 
accumulation as occupying the same role in political economy as original sin does in 
Christianity.98 Fanon’s conception of Euro-modernity as produced through the 
damnation of the colonized provides a telling insight into this theological anchoring 
of the material world. Moreover, it holds particularly relevance in light of the 
contemporary rise of the discourse of ‘humanitarianism’ within international law. 
This conception of the human, used to anchor ideas about international crimes against 
humanity to human rights to humanitarian intervention, contains not only a colonial 
but also a theological inheritance. Thinking of the historical context in which Les 
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Damnés de la Terre was written, the distance between the ‘new humanity’ that Fanon 
called for and the humanitarianism remaking the international legal order at the same 
time, in the mid-twentieth century, is stark. Whilst the humanitarianism of the United 
Nations called for the colonized to join a universal (Europeanised) standard, a move 
betrayed as impossible since Vitoria invitation in the sixteenth century, Fanon 
challenges the very notion of ‘humanity’ in its Euro-modern instantiation. The 
Fanonian call for decolonization is not offered through an appeal to 
particularism/exclusive racial identity, but rather a demand to reconstruct the 
universal conception of humanity through the revolt of those damned by the current 
order. Rather than the demand of humanitarian law for the colonized to realise the 
impossible standards of ‘humanity’, instead it intends to force the colonizer to shed 
the illusions of this idealised humanity. Recognising this element of Fanonian thought 
offers a corrective to the relative absence of substantive engagements with his work in 
the literature on post/decolonial international law and the political/juridico-theological 
international law. Fanon’s offers greater value to juridical scholarship once the 
theological aspect of his writing is read alongside the notion of humanity that 
continues to anchor international law. Fanon illustrates how international law’s 
current conception of humanity is produced though the translation of the theological 
order onto the colonial relation, with the European as a deific surrogate and the 
colonization as the damned. In short, if the law’s mandates that ‘Satan is black’ then 
we should follow Fanon in a Satanic revolt, a revolt against modern law itself.  
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